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From Islam as an
Identity to Secular Politics
An interview with Dr.
Abdulkarim Soroush
By Amir Hossein Khodaparast
Q. Let’s explore the relationship
between religion and modernity. You’ve thought a great deal about
this subject and you’ve have discussed it in your writings. As the
first question, can I ask you to explain what the constituents of
modernity are and what relationship do they establish with
tradition?
A. I believe that any list of
the constituents of modernity that we draw up will be a provisional
and incomplete list, in the sense that there can be a whole variety
of lists of modernity’s constituents. But, before going into the
question of modernity’s constituents, I’d like to explain and
underline one point: speaking about ‘modernity’, ‘tradition’,
‘rationality’, ‘the West’ and the like in this general sense will
not get us anywhere. When we say ‘modern rationality’ or ‘modernity’
or ‘tradition’ or ‘traditional rationality’, these are all extremely
condensed and ambiguous terms. And the cause of this ambiguity is
not that we don’t know the meaning of rationality, tradition or
modernity; the cause is that they contain or subsume dozens, no,
hundreds of issues. When we refer to them or issue verdicts about
them as a single term or concept, we commit a fallacy that logicians
used to describe as the fallacy of ‘subsuming many issues under a
single issue’. In other words, throwing dozens of issues into a
single box and subjecting them all to a single verdict, thereby
causing mental confusion and muddying the waters in such a way as to
prevent clear judgment. I’d like to avoid these kinds of disorders
and ambiguities. I prefer to proceed on the basis of the wise phrase
in the Bible that says: Know a tree by its fruit. I believe that we
mustn’t assign an independent identity to ‘tradition’, ‘modernity’
‘the West’, ‘rationality’ or any other concept of this kind, as if
God had created something called ‘modernity’ or as if a creature or
a monster by this name had emerged or popped out of history. We
mustn’t do this. I explained the pitfalls of doing this. We must
learn about these things by their fruits. I believe that
‘rationality’ is nothing (at least when we wish to make judgments
about it) other than rationality’s products; just as ‘tradition’ is
nothing other than this; just as ‘modernity’ is nothing other than
this. In other words, I believe that ‘rationality’ equals
rationality’s products; that is to say, it equals philosophy,
science, morality, politics, technology, rites and customs, urban
development, architecture, language, industry, etc. These are all
products of rationality. In other words, if human beings weren’t
rational, they wouldn’t have produced these things and history
wouldn’t have taken the course that it has so far. And if we say
that rationality is changeable, it is because these products are
changeable. In other words, you can see that philosophy changes,
science changes and so on. This means that, as the post-modernists
put it, we don’t have ‘a single rationality’; we have
‘rationalities’. Any judgment of this kind hinges on the products
that these things yield. If we say that rationality is the mother
who bore all these products, this doesn’t alter anything. It still
leaves us with the offspring of that mother. The offspring consist
of the things that I mentioned and we could add other names to that
list of offspring.
The same thing applies
to modernity and tradition. This is a fallacy that historians call
the fallacy of personification; i.e. attaching a personality to
something that doesn’t have a personality. We’ve seen this kind of
personification of history itself. Some people have spoken of
history as if it is a kind of personage, striding along and creating
events, going down this or that particular path or going astray and
so on. I had a friend who has now passed a way. He used to attend
my courses on the philosophy of history. Sometimes he would say to
me jokingly: ‘Sir, we’re being crushed under the wheels of
history!’ This expression, ‘being crushed under the wheels of
history’, belongs to that same school of thought that attaches a
personality to history and depicts it as some kind of train or big
machine that has wheels, with some people on the train, some people
off the train and some people being crushed under its wheels and so
on. From the very start, I would like to warn you and us against
this kind of lethal, bewildering fallacy and to say that we mustn’t
adopt this sort of notion of ‘modernity’. I’m saying this because
when you look at the things that have been written in Iran in recent
times, in just these past 10 years, you can see how prevalent this
personification fallacy is. Of course, when a riddle is solved, it
become easy. The minute you draw people’s attention to this and
tell them, ‘Be careful not to commit this fallacy!’, then everyone
says, We didn’t mean to suggest that ‘history’ or ‘modernity’ is a
personage. But the fact of the matter is that this kind of fallacy
occurs very frequently in people’s judgments and we must be vigilant
not to fall into this trap.
I was looking at the
recent edition of ‘Kheradnameh’ [Journal of Wisdom]. I can quote a
whole range of phrases from it and you can see for yourself that
many of these phrases wouldn’t have been expressed had it not been
for what I called ‘personification’. If you do away with this
fallacy, these phrases will become meaningless. For example, the
expression, ‘the rigidity of tradition’! What does ‘the rigidity of
tradition’ mean? Unless we believe that tradition is some kind of
personage, that it has some kind of kernel and shell, and then we
attribute this notion to it. There’s no difference between this and
‘the wheels of history’ or ‘the dustbin of history’. It rests on
the same presuppositions and connotations. Maybe, at the end of the
interview, I’ll read out some of these phrases to you so that the
point I’m making will become clearer to you. Don’t imagine that
this is merely pedantic nitpicking. Not at all. It flows like
blood through the thoughts and statements of some opinion holders
and it has bloodied their utterances. We must avoid being sullied
in this way. This is why I basically don’t want to speak about a
thing called ‘modernity’. I’m of the opinion that this notion only
exists in the conventions of conventionists and the delusions of the
deluded. When we speak about ‘modernity’, we have to see whether
we’re speaking about ‘modern philosophy’ or ‘modern science’ or
‘modern morality’ or ‘modern politics’ or ‘modern urban development’
or ‘modern religious sects’, etc. I don’t really understand what
something simply called ‘modernity’ means.
Q. I think you gave a similar
warning about ‘the West’ some years ago in your book Taffaroj-e
Sonn [Savouring Creation].
A. Yes, well done!
Q. Do you still abide by your
view that we must pick and choose from modernity? Is such a
selection possible or must we take up ‘modernity wholesale’?
A. We must wait a while
before raising this question. But, in order not to leave your
question unanswered, let me say that I still believe that selection
is the only option. And all the people who deny the possibility of
selection are selectors in practice, because there’s no alternative
in practice. The simplest proof and instance of this is that we’ve
already brought modern philosophy into our universities. We’ve
embraced part of modernity. We’ve imported and used modern science
and modern technology, such as computers, telephones, aircraft and
hundreds of other tools and instruments. Unless you go back to that
same line of thinking and say that none of this is ‘modernity’; that
‘modernity’ is something else, a spirit, a truth and an entity
beyond all this. I know nothing about this entity and I believe
that people who say things like this know nothing about it either!
They just use some meaningless words that have caused a great deal
of confusion.
At any rate, my
suggestion is that, in the manner of analytical philosophers, we
should analyse the question before we embark on an answer. If the
question isn’t posed correctly, we won’t arrive at a correct answer
either. In order to formulate an answer, we must explore the
concepts that are latent in the question. We have three concepts
here: ‘relationship’, ‘religion’ and ‘modernity’. Not everything
that I’m saying is negative. That is to say, it’s not just a taking
apart and deconstruction; it has positive aspects as well. When I
say, We should take care not to allow the word ‘modernity’ create an
independent identity and entity which does not exist in the real
world, I don’t stop there; I also suggest that ‘modernity’ is
nothing other than a series of things that have occurred in modern
times. Of course, we also have to take a stance on these ‘modern
times’ and say what the starting point was. I don’t really believe
in absolute historical breaks although I do believe that major
events have taken place in history and, when you survey the final
products of these events, you see that there are many differences
with that which existed before. When you compare jets with horses
or mules or wagons, which existed in the past, you see a big leap.
But if you delve into the heart of the history of technology or the
history of science, you’ll see clear continuities and it’s not as if
a jet was suddenly invented after a wagon. It is the same in the
realm of thought, science and philosophy. At any rate, we have to
treat this ‘breaks’ business with great care.
Bearing all this in
mind, if we make the start of the Renaissance a special point, as a
matter of convention, and if we consider everything before this
point to be ‘pre-modern times’ and everything after it to be ‘modern
times’, then, these modern times have yielded products and we can
speak about each of these products.
I take ‘tradition’ to
mean ‘pre-modernity’ and the same rule applies to pre-modernity as
modernity. We don’t have something called ‘tradition’ that has an
identity and an essence; what we have is ‘pre-modern philosophy’,
‘pre-modern religion’, ‘pre-modern science’, ‘pre-modern morality’
and so on. If all this is true, then, at least our question becomes
clear and we can embark on an answer.
Q. If we examine the causes
of these products and fruits of modernity and then examine the
causes of those causes and so on, will we be able to pinpoint one or
several causes or factors behind modernity?
A. Good question. Look! Two
things are usually confused here. We may explore modernity’s
products and find common factors between them. And we may notice
that things like the philosophy, the art, etc. that were produced in
Europe since the 16th century, for example, have
commonalities. We may term these commonalities (assuming that we
find them and, of course, we can never find them all) the bases of
modernity. But there is a difference between bases and causes,
because, if you want to find the causes, you have to look for them
in pre-modern times, since that’s where the causes originated.
Ultimately, we have to declare that ‘tradition is the cause of
modernity’. We won’t arrive at anything more than this, which is no
great achievement. But if we want to arrive at what you’re talking
about, then we have to find commonalities between these products or,
as Wittgenstein put it, ‘resemblances between these children’. We
could then say that there are some things that are common to all the
products of modernity and consider them to be the bases or
constituents of modernity. But, as I said, we have to recognize
that, first, if we use the term ‘constituents’ or ‘bases’ of
modernity, it is in a metaphorical sense only. In other words, we
have no single essence that has certain bases; we arrive at the
bases through comparisons and the discovery of commonalities.
Secondly, this list is always provisional. And no element can be
singled out as more important than any other element.
What we find in the
material that has been written about modernity is, one, the fallacy
of personification and, two, single-factor analyses of history. It
is as if there is one main factor, on which modernity, as a
personage, is sitting or leaning or which is the spirit of this
modern personage, and, then, people quarrel over this single
factor. Some people say that this single factor is humanism;
others, the will to power; others, critical reason; others,
essential change in human nature; etc. I believe that some of
these can be correct, but not as the essence of modernity; rather,
as an element that is obtained when we compare the products of
modernity, a more or less observed common point between them. The
claim that, for example, humanity is latent in all the products of
modernity (i.e. philosophy, science, art, morality, etc.) is a bold
claim indeed, unless one is afflicted with academic arrogance. I
believe that what has come about in the modern world is much too
varied to be explained by a single factor. One writer said that
humanism can be seen in all the novels that have been written in the
West. I wrote in reply: ‘Have you read all the novels that have
been written in the West?! Do you know about all the novels that
have yet to be written?!’ One has to be very arrogant to speak in
this way; unless we resort to a tautology and say: ‘I’m speaking
about those novels that contain humanism.’ In which case, ‘humanism
can be seen in all the novels that contain humanism’!
I have no idea
whatsoever how this humanism seeped into physics! How did it manage
to flow through chemistry and biology! I truly don’t understand. I
don’t understand because I haven’t arrived at this conclusion myself
and because no one else has explained it either. I haven’t seen any
piece of writing that demonstrates precisely, philosophically and
scientifically how humanism seeped into physics. These are all
careless, delusory remarks, which have been uttered and which are
simply repeated by others. And there is no one to take these people
by the collar and to say, Speak in concrete terms and show me how,
in this or that concrete instance, the spirit about which you’re
speaking has had an impact and made its presence felt.
Now, I’m of the view
that tradition and modernity, too, are two complementary concepts,
in the sense that, if we explore one of them, we will also shed
light on the other, since, as I said, we use ‘modernity’ to denote
modern times or, more clearly, the products of modern times and we
use ‘tradition’ to denote the products of pre-modern times.
Whichever one we look at, we’ll also end up defining the other one.
Q. Is it because of the
difficulty of modernity’s roots as a subject that writers have
devoted themselves more to its fruits?
A. No, I’m fundamentally of
the view that it’s not at all clear that the roots of modernity is a
correct and useful subject of discussion. We have to alter our
understanding of tradition and modernity. They are more simple
concepts than they are at times made to appear. We have to look at
modernity’s products and, then, find the commonalities between them
if we can. This is a long-term, unending, empirical task. In other
words, one would have to be very bold indeed to say that one knows
what the spirit of modern philosophy or the spirit of modern art
is. We may have some passing hypotheses or suggestions in this
connection, but speaking about their spirit is very difficult. Even
if you know philosophy, what about science? If you know science,
what about art? If you know art, what about morality? What about
politics? And so on. Moreover, the variety that exists in the
modern world doesn’t allow us to know them all and to issue a
single, all-embracing ruling.
I think that the idea
of viewing things ‘historically’ which we see today in
historiography, philosophy and post-modernism has beneficial,
illuminating aspects. What is meant by ‘historically’ is that we
should view events with their own particular historical-cultural
characteristics; we shouldn’t try to eliminate these
characteristics. We shouldn’t try to peel them away with the aim of
arriving at a kernel and an essence and then extend this kernel and
essence to everything in an ahistorical way. We mustn’t turn
modernity into an eternal, timeless creature, with no historical and
geographic characteristics. We mustn’t imagine that it is an
essence that manifests itself in the same way everywhere and
overlook the fact that it was a specific historical event, which
occurred in a particular time and place and had particular
characteristics. It is the same with ‘tradition’. And one of the
reasons for this is that history is fundamentally the arena of
possibilities, not the arena of necessities. What occurred in
Europe was a possible occurrence, not a necessary occurrence;
things could have turned out differently.
Hence, imagining that
modernity has an essence, viewing this essence in an ahistorical way
and harbouring any conceptions of this kind must be abandoned. I
believe that the best method here is the empirical, inductive,
nominalistic, historical and particularist approach; i.e. looking
at the particular characteristics and the commonalities of the
fruits and products. End of story.
Q. What does this modernity,
for which you foresee no essence, do with tradition?
A. Instead of answering your
question, I’ll try to analyse the question again. The problem is
simpler than appears at first. That is to say, once the question is
analysed, finding the answer becomes simpler. Asking ‘what
modernity does with tradition’ is, in my view, not the correct way
of formulating the question. As I said, modernity means modern
philosophy, modern art, modern morality, modern politics, etc. I’ll
keep repeating this until it takes hold. And tradition means
pre-modern philosophy, pre-modern art, etc. Now, when analysed, the
question becomes, ‘What does new philosophy do with old
philosophy?’, ‘What does new science do with old science?’, ‘What
does new art do with old art?’
If you see modernity
as a huge, general phenomenon and tradition as another huge, general
phenomenon, you’ll create such a murky picture as to make it
impossible to find an answer to your question and any answer will be
confused and ambiguous. But when you take it apart and deconstruct
it, the answer become relatively clear. You can now see with your
own eyes what new science has done to old science. It has pushed
old science aside. It’s patently clear. If you use old science,
you can’t make many of the things that we make with new science.
Old science was only capable of achieving what we saw it achieve.
Although, even when we speak about old science, we’re speaking in
ambiguous terms. Is old science, old medicine? Is it old physics?
Is it the old religious fields? Which one do we mean? Take old
medical science and pharmacology and compare them with new medical
science and pharmacology. Now the question has become very
straightforward and the answer is more or less within reach. It’s
not a question of good or bad. We may put our foot down and insist
that old medical science had more benefits than new medical
science. This is another matter. But on the question of what new
medical science has done with old medical science, it is patently
clear. None of today’s hospitals, with their current resources and
facilities, existed in the past. Vast fields such as biochemistry,
histology, embryology, etc. didn’t exist. The decisions and
diagnoses that take place on the basis of these basic medical fields
obviously didn’t exist. And so on. It is the same in all the other
branches of science. The moment you break down ‘what does modernity
do with tradition’ to its components (as Descartes suggested),
you’ll triumph. The question itself will be flooded with light.
All the darkness will recede and the answer will become very
straightforward. Or, at least, the way to the answer will become
clear.
I just suddenly
noticed a phrase in the ‘Kheradnameh’: ‘The other important area to
be discussed concerns the rigidity of tradition. We have to discover
whether rigidity is an essential characteristic of tradition or
not.’ You see? This remark really means nothing to me. No matter
how many times I turn it over in my mind, it fails to make any
sense. What does ‘rigidity is an essential characteristic of
tradition’ mean? What is tradition? What is rigidity? What is an
essential characteristic? When you line up a series of concepts
that are all being used incorrectly, you pile up darkness upon
darkness and block your own way to the light. The sentence that I
read is from an article about law. Fine, we have traditional law
and we have modern law. It’s reasonable to ask about the
relationship between the two. I’ve always said, for my own part,
that modern law is more rights-oriented than duty-oriented and
pre-modern law is more duty-oriented than rights-oriented. I’ve
never spoken about this as the essence of modern law. But I’m of
the view that this is one of the prominent differences between these
two legal systems, when we compare the two. No doubt, a jurist and
an expert on the subject would be able to probe more deeply into
these differences. This, at any rate, is how it’s done. But if you
choose to investigate something obscure by the name of tradition and
something even more obscure by the name of essential characteristic,
you’ll block your way to the light and never arrive at an answer.
Look, people have been
talking about tradition and modernity in Iran for 10, 15 years.
Please tell me, have we moved forward by a single step? My verdict
is that no light has been shed on this subject, because, from the
start, we built a dark chamber into which no light can penetrate.
We’ve constructed such thick walls that no sunlight can penetrate
therein and lighten up this dark chamber. We must break down these
walls and, instead of these hefty walls, install windows or throw
open the doors in order to allow in some light, as well as some
fresh air. To breathe and to unwind! Then, we can move closer to
some kind of result.
Q. I’ll try to use the term
‘modernity’ a bit less and to speak about the characteristics of the
modern world a bit more -
A. No, use the terminology
that’s current and that you’re comfortable with when you ask your
questions. It’s up to me to take the questions apart and possibly
to show where the flaws lie in this debate, so that we can draw out
the poison and tame the question.
Q. At any rate, the products
of modernity have an effective presence in the modern world. What
do you consider to be the most important effects of modernity’s
products on religion?
A. Let me first advance a bit
more in my assault! We said that we should know modernity by its
fruits. Now, I want to go even further. Why fruits? These things
are modernity.
What does it mean to say that modern philosophy, modern science and
modern politics and modern art are the fruits of modernity?
Modernity is
these things. Modernity amounts to these modern elements. We line
these things up and they constitute the modern world.
Q. You've taken Ockham's
razor and are cutting away!
A. (Laughing) We must trim
away what we can. What stop halfway? Look, we compromised a bit
and said that these are the fruits of modernity in order to ward off
any possible hostility. Now, I want to suggest that these things
are modernity and
not its fruits. As I said, we have two worlds: the pre-modern
world and the modern world. And I said that this separation is a
matter of convention, but we accept it more or less. I also said
that we mustn't deny the continuity between these two worlds
either. We mustn't just look at the break. The break is true, but
the continuity is also true, although the break is more obvious and
the continuity is more invisible and it has to be viewed and
analysed with a microscope.
At any rate, the
modern world means these same modern objects, although we're looking
at their conceptual aspects now; otherwise, we can add their
non-conceptual aspects as well, such as modern tools and
instruments. So, this is
modernity. Modernity is not some kind of striking-looking ogre. We
mustn't go looking for a spirit or a treasure chest or a dark cellar
from which these things emanated. Modernity
is these things.
This is very similar
to the question of 'the external world' in peripatetic philosophy.
An individual with an inexperienced mind begins by saying that, in
the external world, there is a table, a book, the sea, water, the
sun and so on. But, when his mind acquires philosophical
complexity, he understands that these things aren't
in the external
world, they are
the external world. The external world isn't something within which
they've placed these things. The external world itself consists of
this table, this book, this cup, this saucer and so on; nothing
else. If these things didn't exist, then there would be no external
world. It's not as if there's an external world that is empty and
is then filled with various things. It is the same with modernity,
but our imagination has turned modernity into a vessel, giving the
impression that philosophy and art are items in the vessel; whereas
this isn't the case. The vessel and the items in the vessel are one
and the same here. The same thing applies to tradition. Pre-modern
philosophy is not something contained within tradition; it
is tradition.
Pre-modern science, etc. are
tradition.
Now, let us turn to
religion. First of all, when you use this word, it gives the
impression that you've decided that all religions have a single
essence and that you're going to deal with them wholesale! The
nominalistic, particularistic, historical method that I subscribe to
doesn't allow us to speak of something by the name of 'religion'.
Philosophers and historians of religion are arriving at a consensus
on this point and almost all of them acknowledge that religions
don't have a single essence or a single spirit. Historical analyses
have shown them that religions have similarities and commonalities,
but they don't have a single essence. Hence, they always speak about
'religions'. Hence, our question must be, What becomes of
'religions' in the modern world?
But we don't want to
speak about all religions anyway, since they all have their own
tales. So, we have to step into a particular area, with which we're
more familiar and to which we're more sensitive; i.e. the religion
of Islam.
So, our question now
is: What becomes of Islam in the modern world. Even Islam is a word
that's used to convey dozens of meanings. I'm not speaking about
the different readings of religion. Certainly, Islam consists of the
different readings of Islam. And Christianity consists of the
different readings of Christianity. But, at the moment, I'm
speaking about something else: on occasion, we consider Islam to be
a religion that gives people an identity and, on other occasions, we
consider it to be a religion that teaches truths. It has at least
these two facets. Religiosity can also be interests-oriented
(utilitarian) or it can be knowledge-oriented (gnostic) or
experience-oriented (experiential). Religiosity and Islam can also
be considered to have other facets. I believe that each of these
have to be discussed separately.
The answer to the
question is relatively clear with respect to other religions,
especially Christianity. If you ask, What has become of
Christianity in the modern world, I'll say to you: Step right this
way and take a look! Here's the modern world and this is the West!
At least organizationally and in its capacity as an identity, we can
see what has become of Christianity. Secularism has come to prevail
in the West and Christianity has been driven out of the public
sphere to a large extent. And this has given the Church a role that
is very different from the Church's role in the pre-modern world.
As for Islam, we must still wait for the relevant historical
experiences. That is to say, we have to wait and see what will
happen to Islam in terms of an identity and Islam in terms of
truths. We have to wait and see what will happen to religious
experience and to religious knowledge. Some of the answers are clear
and some of them are not clear and we can only make guesses.
Q. If I may, I'd like to ask
you about Islam as an identity. There are many debates about it
relationship with modernity. What is the situation of religion as an
identity in the modern world?
A. Let us look at the West
again. One of the things that have occurred in the modern world is
the creation of new identities. In the past, national identities
didn't exist, because there was no such thing as a nation-state. We
had the realm of Islam [Dar-al-Islam]
and Christendom. In the modern age, nation-states emerged, the
concept of a nation was created and a new identity known as national
identity came about. At first, it seemed as if it did not clash
with people's religious identity but gradually these two things
began to clash. This conflict continues to exist in the modern
world. Whenever religion has been weak, the clash has also abated
and, whenever religion has been strong, the clash has surfaced.
I remember being in
the United States when the US was sending troops to Iraq. There are
Muslim Americans among US troops and the administration wanted to
send some of them to Iraq too. The question arose: Can An American
Muslim go to war with a Muslim country? This question only arises in
the context of a conflict between national identity and religious
identity. What was the answer? The US Administration obtained fatwas
from a number of Sunni clerics, who were Americans and lived in the
US, and published them in leading newspapers. The clerics had ruled
that people's national identity takes priority over their religious
identity; that American Muslim soldiers had a right, no, a duty, to
perform their duty as soldiers and to go to war with Iraqis; and
that they should not fear killing or being killing there.
When you ask, What
becomes of religion as an identity, this is one very distinct
example. New identities have emerged in modern times, the most
important of which is this one, a national identity. Of course,
national identities are more or less in the process of receding.
One recent debate has been about what Europe means and who qualifies
as a European. As you know, the European Union is gradually
overshadowing the concept of 'the German nation', 'the British
nation', 'the Belgian nation', 'the Dutch nation' and so on. And new
nations are being brought into the EU. There's a debate now about
Turkey and its possible entry into the EU. One hotly-debated
question these days is, 'What does being European consist of?' Are
the Turks Europeans too or not? What is the essence of being
European? And they have come to the conclusion that there is no such
essence. If there was such a thing as a European essence, some
people would automatically fall outside Europe and other people
would automatically fall within Europe. They said: There's no such
essence.
Now, the point is that
this notion of a nation-state (which remains in force but has
receded somewhat) can conflict with people's religious identities.
With respect to Christianity, we can say that something by the name
of a Christian identity is no longer defined for anyone in the
general social sphere. People are known by their national
identities. It's not stated in anyone's identity papers that they
are Christian; only national identities are recorded. So, national
identities have pushed aside this religious identity. But, as I
said, this is because of religion's weakness. If people's religious
identity becomes more prominent, regardless of the cause, this
conflict can become very severe. Fundamentalism is nothing other
than this. A religious identity is making its presence felt. In
other words, some people are saying, We're neither Americans, nor
Iranians, nor Arabs; we're Muslims and this is our identity and
we're at war with the US in the name of our Islamic identity. This
has been called 'fundamentalism' and perhaps it would have been
better if it had been called 'identity-ism'. But if they'd called
it 'identity-ism', then, it would have raised a question that they
wouldn't have been able to answer: If 'identity-ism' is bad, why
are you 'identity-ists' yourselves? Why is it that a US identity is
good but an Islamic identity is bad?
In Iran, too, people
beat on this 'identity' drum with great enthusiasm. Many of the
things that go by the name of religious rituals in our country, many
of the religious remarks that are made in our society, especially
from official platforms, basically rest on identity-oriented
thinking and the inculcation of an identity known as a religious
identity. As you may recall, in the early days of the revolution,
some people wanted to harp on a clash between our Iranian identity
and our Islamic identity. This is clearly an issue that arises in
the modern world.
Q. How do you picture the
future? Do you think that just as identity-oriented Christianity
has gradually receded, the same thing will happen with Islam?
A. No, that's not my
impression at all. First of all, the indications that we have in
the world today don't point in that direction at all. Secondly, 'the
essence of history' (laughing) doesn't suggest such a thing.
History is full of possibilities and the future is truly open in
this sense and events will occur that are unimaginable to people
today. I was telling a friend that, with the progress of learning
and book printing, some experts were worried that the felling of
trees and the destruction of forests for the production of paper and
books would badly harm the environment. But, suddenly, something
came to the rescue from within oil wells. They produced the raw
material for making CDs and diskettes and computers, so that paper
consumption fell dramatically and, maybe, the learning of the future
will be paper-less; something that we couldn't have imagined
before. This is why I say that history's resources are so varied
and so unimaginable as to steer us completely away from historical
determinism.
At the same time,
sociologists have on the whole changed their previous view whereby
they used to maintain that history was inevitably moving towards
secularism. And one of the reasons for their revised opinion is the
emergence of fundamentalism or, as I put it, 'identity-ism' in
modern times. Religious identities have now surfaced and that
secularism thesis, which held that religions were dying away and
would only make their presence felt in the private sphere, has now
been more or less falsified.
In sociology, they
always used to speak about one exception. They’d say, The US has
remained religious but the rest of the world is moving towards
secularism. But, with the passage of time, the exceptions
proliferated to such an extent that it became clear that they’d been
wrong about the rule. So, I can’t make any prediction. What I can
say is that it is by no means definite that the future belongs to
non-religious identities. As it happens, it’s quite likely that
religious identities will resurface, that they will become
event-makers again and that the future will be completely different
from the present. Hence, the shaping of identities by religions may
be a growing phenomenon.
Let me also make one
normative point: we have to be vigilant and to try and ensure that,
as identities become corpulent, so do truths, because fundamentalism
is in effect the triumph of identity over truth; not just the growth
of religious identities, but their growth at the expense of
religion’s truths. That is to say, the inflation and corpulence of
identity at the cost of the neglect and weakness of truth. This is
religious identity-ism in its reprehensible sense. Thinkers and
theoreticians must try to prevent this inauspicious possibility.
Q. Your words recall what Mr.
Shayegan used to say some years ago. He’d say, Either Islam will
become spiritual/mystical or it will turn into a fundamentalist
religion and then fade away. Are these the two options that lie
ahead?
A. I think that we can also
postulate a third option and to bring it about in practice: to
strike a balance between the different dimensions of religions as
truths and as identities. If this balance is lost, we will either
arrive at fundamentalism or at Sufism, which is a kind of triumph of
truth over identity.
Q. How can a fundamentalist
Muslim be made to realize that the truth dimension of religion
should be emphasized and that the identity dimension should not be
made corpulent at the expense of enfeebling or destroying religion’s
truths?
A. Look! It's not for
nothing that something called religious fundamentalism has come into
being and grown. After the 11 September attacks, I gave a talk at
Princeton University and I said there: 'As long as you continue your
identity-based enmity towards Muslims, this tale will continue.'
Different judgments
apply to identities and truths. In the context of truths, we think
in terms of truth or falsehood. When someone presents something to
you as a truth, you must investigate its truth or falsehood. But
identities have nothing to do with truth or falsehood. In the
context of identities, we think in terms of honour or servility. An
identity is either great and noble or servile; it is either revered
or reviled. Now, if one people humiliates another people and
tramples its identity and honour, those who have been humiliated
react in an identity-based way. Hence, it's not just a question of
reasoning and logic here. If your identity is attacked, it's clear
what your reaction will be and this is something that takes place in
the modern world. We must combat the effects by removing the
causes. I more or less agree with Mr Huntington's theory of the
clash of civilizations; not as a historical prediction, but in the
sense that I agree with him that civilizations are identities and
identities clash with each other. Hence, here, too, a balance must
be struck, in Spengler's words, between culture and civilization. He
suggests that culture is civilization's spirit and that civilization
is culture's body. If there's no balance here, then, a clash is
inevitable. It's like a person who is a big bully but has a very
small brain. Someone like this just looks for quarrels.
Q. You spoke about
identities. Please say something about truths too.
A. Yes, in fact this is the
other side of the coin to your previous question. This, too, has to
be broken down to its components. This question also breaks down
into several questions: 'What does modern philosophy do to Islam?',
'What does modern science do to Islam?', 'What does modern art do to
Islam', etc. And this is the simple meaning of that big phrase 'the
relationship between Islam and modernity'. In other words, we have
to see what modern philosophy has done to the Islam of truths, that
is to say, Islam's teachings. Opinions vary on this. Mr. Motahhari
believed the Islamic philosophy is a very strong philosophy and is
capable of answering all new philosophical problems and that there
are no philosophic flaws in Islam. This is one view. There are also
other views. As to my own view, I neither believe that Islamic
philosophy is the strongest philosophy in the world, nor that it has
the answer to all philosophical questions. Nor do I believe that it
is possible to extract a philosophical system from Islam.
I think that the much
more important question in the world today is: 'What does modern
science do to the Islam of truths?' A few months ago, a seminar on
'science and religion' was held in Tehran under the auspices of the
Academy of Philosophy. I wasn't here, but I followed it from afar
because I'm very interested in this subject. One of the things that
really caught my attention was the seminar's closing resolution. It
was a testimony to naivety and arrogance; to an arrogance arising
from naivety.
The resolution
consisted of just three or four points and I believe that it must
have been written by someone who knew nothing about history or the
modern world or science. It grieved me to read it. One point
declared that, since we Muslims have not had any clash between
science and religion, we can assist the people of the world in this
respect and extricate them from this quandary. This claim is
brimming with the arrogance that comes from naivety. Certainly! We
haven't experienced such a clash, but this has been to our
detriment, not to our benefit. The clash that took place between
modern science and the Church and Scripture was the harbinger of
many blessings, and both science and religion, and both the bearers
of science and the bearers of religion benefited from these
blessings. In a word, the blessing was that both science and
religion became more modest. And, of course, a ceasefire was
established between them. I'm not saying that the clash was
resolved. No! But a ceasefire was established; a ceasefire that is
broken from time to time but without ever escalating into the fierce
battle that it was four centuries ago. We haven't had this battle.
If, one day, such a clash occurs and the socio-political conditions
come about for this kind of direct head-to-head, it is then that we
must judge how religion will emerge from this clash. Of course, my
judgment is that, then, we won't see any more resolutions like the
one I mentioned.
We can also ask about
modern politics. This issue goes back to the tale of secularism
again. Let us consider whether modern politics brings religion onto
the stage or sets it aside. My judgment in this respect is based
more on practical and external considerations than on conceptual and
mental ones. It depends on religion's strength. In other words, I'm
of the view that we mustn't imagine that the separation of religion
from politics occurred on any particular person's recommendation
(good-willed or ill-willed). Political philosophers have said a
great deal about this of course but the truly determining factor is
the strength or weakness of religion itself. The clash between
science and religion that we were speaking about was one of the
factors that led to secularism in the West; it tends to receive less
attention. The fact of the matter is that, in the clash between
science and religion, religion lost its credibility or its
credibility diminished. It lost much of its former strength and it
has never regained its former standing. Well, a weak player is not
allowed into the game. As long as the player was strong, it was in
the game and what it said mattered in the realm of politics and
power. What does politics mean anyway? Politics means the theory
of power and the exercising of power. In the realm of politics, if
you aren't a strong creature, no one will pay any attention to you.
But when you become strong, you step into the realm of politics and
you can't be disregarded. For example, if you want to establish a
consultative council, you bring together the wise ones among your
people to consult with; you don't bring a five-year-old kid into
your consultative council. When the kid grows, when he matures,
then they allow him into the game. It's the same in the realm of
politics. A weak player is not allowed into the game. What he says
doesn't carry any weight.
Religion was strong
once. And its strength lay in the fact that it had a place in
people's hearts. It was strong because people had faith. But when
this faith and heartfelt commitment became weak and religion, too,
consequently, became weak, then, it wasn't taken seriously in the
realm of politics either and it very naturally - without it having
been based on anyone's recommendation or order or reasoning -
separated from politics. It's like when a man and a woman are
seeking a divorce. This has one aspect that is volitional and
legal. But it may happen in a particular case that one of the
spouses dies. This doesn't hinge on any action or recommendation;
it is a natural separation. Once upon a time, religion and politics
were together. They worked together and had creditable strength.
Sometimes this one would get the upper hand over the other one and
sometimes it would be the other way around. But gradually, things
came to a point where one of the two spouses became so weak that it
died. So, it was no longer a question of anyone drawing up a
formula, preparing a reasoned argument and so on.
This is why I believe
that if religion becomes strong again, it will become a player in
the realm of politics again and, then, secularism will not remain in
its present form. I believe that we are starting to see some
initial signs of this. Here, everything revolves around the axis of
power and strength. It depends on how strong religion is. A strong
creature cannot be set aside easily and told: 'Go away!'
The fact that
secularism prevails in Europe and the US is because religion no
longer has the place that it used to have in people's hearts. The
evidence for this is that you can sit and talk to a learned person,
an ordinary person, etc. - talk and talk for hours, without them
ever saying a single word about God or religious duty. This is a
sign of secularism. Whereas if you sit with a religious person,
you'll see that they constantly have religion on their mind. They
constantly say things like 'What I'm doing is wrong,' 'What I'm
doing is right,' 'Am I allowed to do this or am I not allowed to do
this?' They cite this or that religious authority, this or that
verse from Scripture . But when there is none of this, you realize
that that person's mind is completely devoid of these
considerations. Religion has to have a place in people's hearts.
When religion is absent or weak, then it no longer counts in
politics. It don't exist! But if it begins to exist again at some
later date, it will be impossible for you to ignore it. You will
have to start doing business with it again. I believe that it isn't
just a conceptual matter; it has a real, practical, external aspect.
Q. You said that we must
establish a balance between Islam as an identity and Islam as
truths. As my final question, I’d like to ask you what you think
the priorities of religious intellectuals should be in realizing
this aim?
A. A religious intellectual
is more concerned with religious truths than with religion as an
identity. The Islam of religious intellectuals is the Islam of
truths and the question of an identity is peripheral to this. A
religious intellectual must, first and foremost, concern himself
with faith, religious experience, differing religious readings and
creating the practical conditions for these things.
Translated from the Persian by Nilou Mobasser
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